



Outcome harvesting evaluation: IIEP-UNESCO's support to the education sector plans in Jordan and Guinea

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Executive summary

This document collects, analyses, and evaluates the outcomes of the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) support to two national education sector plans (ESPs): Jordan's 2018–2022 Education Strategic Plan and Guinea's 2020–2029 *Programme Décennal de l'Éducation en Guinée* (ProDEG). This evaluation is an internal pilot exercise for IIEP concerning the use of the outcome harvesting methodology, one which is well-suited for identifying outcomes of capacity development in complex programme environments with many uncertainties. It documents two sets of outcomes: 23 outcomes from the Jordan ESP and 9 from the Guinea ESP, as well as IIEP's contribution to these. Overall, the harvested outcomes can be grouped into three broad findings, as follows.

Improved educational planning and management capacities: In the case of Jordan, several outcomes show positive changes in the way Jordan's Ministry of Education coordinates the sector, which are directly linked to making the ESP the key reference document for sector planning. Some of these also point to improved capacities within the Ministry to monitor sector performance, most notably by organizing annual sector reviews of the ESP implementation in 2019 and 2020. In Guinea, the recorded effects mostly concern institutional and regulatory changes. In particular, this year a new regulation has defined the previously unclear responsibilities of the ministerial units involved in the planning process, an issue that was analysed, discussed, and defined in the ESP. In both countries, IIEP contributed indirectly to these improvements by providing guidance on the structure and content of the plans.

Leadership: The harvested outcomes in both countries point to some positive effects of the ESP on sector leadership. In Jordan, the Planning Directorate has gained greater legitimacy to act and coordinate the sector, through the coordinating and leadership role it played in the plan preparation process and in the annual ESP reviews. In Guinea, the outcome statements show how the technical work on the ESP was used by the political leadership to advance jointly across the country's three education ministries. The renewed functioning of the inter-ministerial steering and coordination committee, the sole political body for sector coordination, and the formulation of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) as a strong national priority, are directly linked to the technical work on the ESP. IIEP's participatory way of working made direct contributions to the education ministries' leadership on the plan.

Changes in government-development partner relationships: As a result of the validation of the ESPs, several development partners changed their aid modality to have either more budget support (Jordan) or pooled funding (Guinea). In Jordan, the aid disbursements from these partners and others also increased substantially following the ESP endorsement. However, in Guinea the pooled funding support is conditional on the Government's own financial contribution to the education sector, which as of October 2020 had not yet materialized. IIEP was instrumental in ensuring the development of solid sector plans, without which partners would not have changed their aid modalities.

In terms of learning for IIEP, two aspects emerge as key for the sustainability of IIEP's efforts. First, before committing to a new ESP it seems vital to assess how IIEP's support can promote improvements in the educational administration's internal planning and management procedures. It is essential that the ESP serve more than the purpose of external resource mobilization. Second, the harvested outcomes show that IIEP's participatory way of developing ESPs with national officials has had direct

positive effects on sector leadership. Clearly, the ways in which IIEP respects and works with national technical teams is a precious asset, and one worth protecting to ensure sustainable results.

Résumé exécutif

Cette évaluation rassemble et analyse les résultats de l'appui de l'IIPE-UNESCO à deux plans sectoriels d'éducation (PSE) : le plan stratégique de l'éducation de la Jordanie pour la période 2018-2022 et le Programme décennal de l'éducation en Guinée (ProDEG) pour la période 2020-2029. C'est pour l'IIPE un exercice interne sur l'utilisation de la méthode *outcome harvesting* (récolte des effets), une méthode bien adaptée pour identifier les effets (*outcome* en anglais) de développement des capacités dans des environnements de programmes complexes avec beaucoup d'incertitudes. L'exercice documente un ensemble de 23 résultats du PSE en Jordanie et de 9 résultats en Guinée, ainsi que la contribution de l'IIPE à ces résultats. Dans l'ensemble, les effets « récoltés » peuvent être regroupés en trois grands axes :

Amélioration des capacités de planification et de gestion de l'éducation - Plusieurs résultats montrent des changements positifs dans la façon dont le ministère de l'Éducation jordanien coordonne le secteur. Ces changements sont directement liés au fait que le PSE est le document de référence clé pour la planification. Certains résultats indiquent également une amélioration des capacités du ministère à suivre les performances du secteur, notamment en organisant des revues sectorielles annuelles de la mise en œuvre du PSE en 2019 et 2020. En Guinée, les effets enregistrés concernent principalement des changements institutionnels et réglementaires. En 2020, en particulier, un nouveau règlement a défini les responsabilités auparavant peu claires des unités ministérielles impliquées dans le processus de planification. Cette question avait été analysée, discutée et définie dans le PSE. Dans les deux pays, l'IIPE a contribué indirectement à ces améliorations en donnant des recommandations sur la structuration et le contenu des plans.

Leadership - Les effets récoltés en Jordanie et en Guinée montrent que le PSE a eu des effets positifs sur le leadership du secteur. En Jordanie, la direction de la Planification a gagné en légitimité pour agir et coordonner le secteur grâce au rôle de coordination et de leadership qu'elle a joué dans le processus de préparation du plan et dans les revues annuelles du PSE. En Guinée, les résultats finaux montrent comment le travail technique sur le PSE a été utilisé par les dirigeants politiques pour faire progresser conjointement les trois ministères de l'Éducation du pays. Le fonctionnement renouvelé du comité interministériel de pilotage et de coordination - seul organe politique de coordination du secteur -, et l'instauration de l'enseignement technique et de la formation professionnelle comme une priorité nationale forte sont directement liés au travail technique sur le PSE. Le mode de travail participatif de l'IIPE a contribué directement au leadership des ministères de l'Éducation sur le PSE.

Changements dans les relations entre le gouvernement et les partenaires de développement - À la suite de la validation des PSE, plusieurs partenaires de développement ont modifié leur modalité d'aide en faveur d'un appui budgétaire accru (Jordanie) et d'un financement commun (Guinée). En Jordanie, les versements d'aide par les partenaires ont également augmenté de manière substantielle après l'approbation du PSE. En Guinée, l'appui au financement commun est conditionné à la contribution financière propre du gouvernement guinéen au secteur de l'éducation. Celle-ci ne s'était pas encore matérialisée en octobre 2020. L'IIPE a contribué à assurer l'élaboration de plans sectoriels solides, sans lesquels les partenaires n'auraient pas modifié les modalités de leur aide.

En termes d'apprentissage pour l'IIPE, deux aspects apparaissent comme essentiels pour la durabilité des efforts de l'Institut. Premièrement, avant de s'engager dans un nouveau PSE, il semble essentiel d'évaluer comment le soutien de l'IIPE peut aider à l'amélioration des procédures de planification et de gestion internes de l'administration de l'éducation. Il est essentiel de s'assurer que le PSE serve au-delà de l'objectif de mobilisation de ressources externes. Deuxièmement, les effets récoltés montrent

que la façon participative dont l'IPE a élaboré les PSE avec les responsables nationaux a eu des effets positifs directs sur le leadership du secteur. Il est clair que la façon dont l'IPE respecte les équipes techniques nationales et travaille avec elles sont des atouts précieux, qu'il convient de protéger pour garantir des résultats durables.

ملخص تنفيذي

يجمع هذا التقييم ويحلل نتائج دعم المعهد الدولي للتخطيط التربوي التابع لليونسكو لخطتين وطنيتين لقطاع التعليم في دولتين؛ الخطة الإستراتيجية للتعليم في الأردن 2018-2022 و 2020-2029 وبرنامج عشر سنوات من التعليم في غينيا. والتقييم عبارة عن تمرين تجريبي داخلي للمعهد الدولي للتخطيط التربوي فيما يتعلق باستخدام منهجية حصاد النتائج، وهي منهجية مناسبة تمامًا لتحديد نتائج تنمية القدرات في بيئات البرامج المعقدة مع الكثير من أوجه عدم اليقين. يوثق التمرين مجموعة من 23 نتيجة من استراتيجيات التعليم في الأردن و 9 نتائج في غينيا، بالإضافة إلى مساهمة المعهد الدولي للتخطيط التربوي في تلك النتائج. بشكل عام، يمكن تصنيف النتائج المحصودة في ثلاث نتائج عامة:

تحسين القدرات التعليمية في التخطيط والإدارة: تُظهر العديد من النتائج تغييرات إيجابية في كيفية تنسيق وزارة التربية والتعليم الأردنية للقطاع، والتغييرات المرتبطة مباشرة بجعل استراتيجيات التعليم الوثيقة المرجعية الرئيسة لتخطيط القطاع. تشير بعض النتائج أيضًا إلى تحسن في القدرات داخل الوزارة من ناحية رصد الأداء في القطاع، وعلى الأخص من خلال تنظيم مراجعات سنوية لتنفيذ الخطة الاستراتيجية في عامي 2019 و 2020. تتعلق التأثيرات المسجلة، في غينيا، في الغالب بالتغييرات المؤسسية والتنظيمية. حددت لائحة جديدة هذا العام، على وجه الخصوص، المسؤوليات غير الواضحة سابقًا للوحدات الوزارية المشاركة في عملية التخطيط، وهي قضية تم تحليلها ومناقشتها وتعريفها في الخطة الاستراتيجية للتعليم. ساهم المعهد الدولي للتخطيط التربوي، في كلا البلدين، بشكل غير مباشر في هذه التحسينات من خلال تقديم إرشادات حول هيكلية ومحتوى الخطط.

القيادة: تشير النتائج المحصودة في الأردن وغينيا إلى بعض الآثار الإيجابية للخطة الاستراتيجية على قيادة القطاع. اكتسبت مديرية التخطيط، في الأردن، من خلال الدور التنسيقي والقيادي الذي لعبته، في عملية إعداد الخطة وفي المراجعات السنوية للاستراتيجية (ESP) مشروعية للعمل وتنسيق القطاع ككل. تُظهر بيانات النتائج، في غينيا، كيف تم توظيف العمل الفني على خطة التعليم الاستراتيجية من قبل القيادة السياسية للتقدم بشكل مشترك عبر وزارات التعليم الثلاث في البلاد. يرتبط العمل المتجدد للجنة التوجيه والتنسيق المشتركة بين الوزارات، وهي الهيئة السياسية الوحيدة لتنسيق العمل بالقطاع، وصياغة التعليم والتدريب المهني والتقني، كأولوية وطنية قوية، ارتباطًا مباشرًا بالعمل الفني المبذول في الخطة الاستراتيجية. قدمت طريقة عمل المعهد الدولي للتخطيط التربوي مساهمات مباشرة لقيادة وزارات التعليم في تطوير الخطة.

التغييرات في العلاقات بين الحكومة والشركاء في التنمية: نتيجة للمصادقة على خطط التعليم الاستراتيجية، قام العديد من شركاء التنمية بتغيير طريقة مساعدتهم إلى تقديم مزيد من الدعم للميزانية (الأردن) والتمويل المجمع (غينيا). في الأردن، زادت مدفوعات المساعدات من هؤلاء الشركاء وغيرهم بشكل كبير بعد المصادقة على خطة التعليم الاستراتيجية. ومع ذلك، في غينيا، يكون دعم التمويل المجمع مشروطًا بالمساهمة المالية للحكومة الغينية في قطاع التعليم والتي لم تتحقق بعد حتى أكتوبر/ تشرين أول 2020. لعب المعهد دورًا أساسيًا في ضمان تطوير خطط تعليم قوية للقطاع، والتي بدونها لم يكن الشركاء ليغيروا أساليب المساعدة التي يقدموها.

فيما يتعلق بالتعلم المكتسب للمعهد الدولي للتخطيط التربوي، يظهر جانبان كمفتاح لاستدامة جهود المعهد. أولاً، قبل الالتزام بتقديم دعم لتطوير استراتيجية تعليم جديدة، يبدو من الضروري تقييم كيف يمكن لدعم المعهد الدولي تعزيز التحسينات في التخطيط الداخلي للإدارة التعليمية والإجراءات الإدارية. من الضروري أن تخدم الاستراتيجيات أكثر من مجرد حشد للموارد الخارجية. ثانيًا، تُظهر النتائج المحصودة أن طريقة المعهد التشاركية لتطوير خطط التعليم الاستراتيجية مع المسؤولين الوطنيين كان لها آثار إيجابية مباشرة على قيادة القطاع، من الواضح أن الطرق التي يحترم بها معهد الدولي الفرق الفنية الوطنية ويعمل معها هو أحد الأصول الثمينة، وهو أمر يستحق الحفاظ عليه لضمان تحقيق نتائج مستدامة.

1. Background

UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) plays a unique role in developing UN Member States’ educational planning and management capacities, through a combination of technical advice, training, and research activities. Over the past decade, the demand for IIEP’s support to the preparation of national education sector plans (ESPs) has increased, and today this ‘product’ forms part of the Institute’s core offer.


IIEP’s current Medium-Term Strategy (MTS 2018–2021) stresses the importance of documenting the results of the Institute’s work, by reporting on a set of key performance indicators and by conducting qualitative assessments of the achievement of IIEP’s strategic objectives. The MTS states that these qualitative assessments ‘will focus on higher-level results (outcomes) that indicate actual change’. This internal evaluation responds to this MTS requirement by examining the outcomes of IIEP’s support to two ESPs: Jordan’s 2018–2022 Education Strategic Plan and Guinea’s 2020–2029 *Programme Décennal de l’Education en Guinée* (ProDEG).

1.1. IIEP’s support to the preparation of national education sector plans

The methodology that IIEP applies in its support to ESPs is similar across countries. IIEP provides an analytical framework and a step-by-step methodology for the preparation process. In practice, IIEP’s support takes the form of technical assistance missions and capacity development workshops with education ministry staff at critical moments of the plan preparation process. This is complemented by distance support, provision of practical guidelines or materials, and reviewing of documents in successive stages of the process. As IIEP does not have field presence, country missions are conducted during a limited number of days at a time, at key stages of the process (see *Figure 1* for an overview of the key stages).

To undertake the technical tasks, IIEP puts together a team of two to five educational planning specialists. During each mission, the IIEP team works with a national technical team to jointly review the work accomplished between missions, to prepare for the next stage in the ESP process, and to conduct workshops with selected groups of ministry staff. The total number of IIEP missions per ESP differs, but tends to range between six and eight over a period of nine to twelve months. Yet there have also been several examples, particularly in recent years, where IIEP has provided much lighter support to the plan preparation process.

Figure 1: Main stages of the ESP preparation process



1.2. The ESP context in Jordan

In early 2017, the former Minister of Education in Jordan requested support from UNESCO for developing the country's next strategic plan for the education sector. To respond to the request, the UNESCO Amman office requested IIEP's technical assistance. IIEP undertook a scoping mission to Amman in May 2017 to discuss and shape the assignment with the Ministry and other key stakeholders. During the scoping mission, the Ministry stressed that the ESP should build closely on the National Human Resources Development Strategy (2016–2025), by drawing together the key elements outlined in this and several other existing planning documents into one coherent and achievable plan specifically focused on pre-primary, primary, secondary, and non-formal education. Several key development partners stressed the importance of including the needs of refugee children in the strategic plan.

The ESP was developed by the Ministry of Education from June 2017 to February 2018, and subsequently launched by the Minister in March 2018. Over this period, IIEP conducted five face to face workshops in Amman, during which approximately 50 participants worked in six groups corresponding to the plan's six priority domains. On average, IIEP's missions lasted for less than a week, with each workshop held over an average of three days. IIEP provided written feedback, and in-between the workshops each group was tasked with specific assignments.

1.3. The education sector plan context in Guinea

Guinea had an ESP for the period 2008–2015, the implementation of which was 'disrupted' at the time of the December 2008 coup d'état and the transition period that saw new presidential elections. During this period, the country developed a transition plan for the period 2015–2017, the implementation of which would create the conditions for a longer-term sector strategy. It is within this framework that the Government of Guinea in 2017 requested IIEP's support for developing an education sector analysis (ESA) (2017–2018), the updating of the education financial simulation model, a 10-year sector plan, and a three-year action plan (in 2019).

After finalization of the sector analysis in December 2018, the work on the 10-year sector plan titled ProDEG begun by the end of January 2019. The work was conducted by a national technical team, including 15 members that represented the three education ministries, the financial ministries, and civil society. In parallel, the updating of the financial simulation model continued following the work that had started during the work on the ESA. From end January to mid-September 2019, IIEP facilitated six face-to-face workshops with the national technical team. IIEP's missions to Guinea lasted for one to two weeks (substantially longer than in Jordan), with assignments to be completed in-between workshops.

The Guinea ESP was validated by the Government on 9 October 2019. However, the actual implementation of the ESP has experienced major delays, and had not yet started at the time of the data collection for this evaluation (October 2020). One main reason for the delay is that the external pooled contributions from three key development partners have not been paid due to the Government's redistribution of public expenditure away from the education sector during the first half of 2020. Other reasons for the delay include the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and the time it has taken for the ministries of education to finalize their respective annual operational plans.

2. Purpose and approach of the evaluation

By means of this internal evaluation, IIEP is interested in documenting the outcomes and learning from the effects of its support to the preparation of the ESPs in Jordan in 2017 and Guinea in 2019. Overall, the Institute wants to know more about the usefulness of ESPs for strengthening Member States' educational planning capacity, and the value of IIEP's contributions to this.

The Jordan and Guinean ESPs were purposively chosen because they represent two very different country contexts and conditions, and are hence of value for capturing a wide range of perspectives relating to 'ESP effects'. The basic principle behind this choice is to gain greater insights by analysing outcomes from two widely different cases and thereby identify common themes that are evident across the sample.

The evaluation is a pilot exercise for IIEP concerning the use of the outcome harvesting method. To be better able to learn and explore the full potential of the method, the work was conducted as an internal evaluation, with coaching support from an external outcome harvesting expert.

2.1. The outcome harvesting method

Outcome harvesting is an evaluation method in which evaluators, project managers, donors and/or beneficiaries identify, formulate, verify, analyse, and interpret outcomes in programming contexts where relations of cause and effect are neither direct nor straightforward. The methodology is particularly well suited for identifying and analysing outcomes of capacity development in complex programme environments with many uncertainties.

'Outcomes' are defined as changes in the 'behaviour writ large', such as actions, relationships, policies, and practices of social actors influenced by an intervention. In contrast to many other evaluation approaches, outcome harvesting does not measure progress against pre-determined indicators and targets, but collects evidence of what has changed and, then, working backwards, determines whether and how an intervention contributed to these changes. The outcome can be positive or negative, intended or unintended.¹

In accordance with the outcome harvesting methodology, the work on this evaluation has included the following main steps:

1. Design the harvest,
2. Review documentation and draft outcomes,
3. Engage with human sources,
4. Substantiate the outcomes,
5. Analyse and interpret,
6. Support the use of findings.

(For further details on the evaluation process, see Annex A.)

¹ This paragraph is adapted from the presentation of the outcome harvesting method on the Better Evaluation webpage: https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/outcome_harvesting

2.2. Users and uses of the evaluation findings

Outcome harvesting is based on the principles of ‘utilization-focused evaluation’.² One important implication of working in accordance with this principle is that the users of the evaluation findings are directly involved in the design of the evaluation, as well as in taking decisions on the direction of the evaluation during the data collection and analysis stages.

The primary users of the evaluation findings are IIEP programme professionals involved in ESA and ESP processes, the Head of IIEP’s Technical Cooperation (TC) team and the person responsible for M&E in the IIEP Director’s Office. These users are all interested in learning about the usefulness of ESPs (process and product) and IIEP’s contributions to these. Both elements can serve to improve the design of IIEP’s support to ESPs. These three sets of users also have an interest in learning about whether and how the outcome harvesting method is useful for IIEP. In addition, the TC Head and the Director’s Office are interested in using the findings for accountability purposes, including reporting and sharing of findings with IIEP’s Governing Board, UNESCO Member States and donors. (For a more detailed overview of uses and users, see Annex B.)

2.3. Evaluation questions

In light of the intended uses as well as of what was practically feasible with the time and resources at our disposal, the following evaluation questions were agreed upon with the primary users and the evaluators:

- **Evaluation question 1:** To what extent has IIEP made identifiable contributions to strengthen technical capacities in planning and managing the Jordanian and Guinean education sectors?
- **Evaluation question 2:** To what extent has IIEP made identifiable contributions to technical and political leadership and ownership of the Education Sector Plans in Jordan and Guinea?
- **Evaluation question 3:** Which strategies used by IIEP were effective and which were not effective in contributing to outcomes?

2.4. Limitations

Overall, the evaluation has been able to follow the outcome harvesting methodology according to plan. However, some limitations need to be taken into account. These include:

- Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the data collection had to be conducted entirely at a distance, through virtual interviews with the key informants. Although this worked well in general, an even richer database would certainly have been collected if the evaluators had been able to meet with the informants in person.
- The harvested outcomes should not be considered as exhaustive. This is particularly the case in Jordan, where it became clear that the effects of the ESP are far-reaching. It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to interview representatives from all parts of the Ministry of Education and all the concerned Royal entities. If this had been done, a much larger set of outcomes

² Patton, M.Q. 2008. *Utilization-Focused Evaluation*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

would surely have been collected. Yet the fact that a number of interviewees identified and/or confirmed the same core group of outcomes permits us to consider that these might represent the most significant achievements.

3. Evaluation findings

3.1. Evaluation question 1: What were IIEP's contributions to better planning and management capacities?

IIEP's core mandate is capacity development in educational planning and management. It is hence of interest to explore if and how such effects are observable following the Institute's support to the ESPs in Jordan and Guinea. Capacity development can in principal occur at individual, organizational and institutional levels.

In Jordan, the harvested outcomes detect several **positive effects of the ESP on the Ministry's ability to coordinate the work in the education sector**. In particular, the effects are closely linked to the wide acceptance and reliance on the ESP as the single reference policy document among the key actors in the sector. No less than 9 of the 23 harvested outcomes in Jordan show how the ESP has triggered closer coordination within the educational administration, as well as with external partners. Both the plan preparation process and the final product, the ESP, have been key for the recorded effects on improved coordination. Three examples are:

- Since the launch of the ESP in March 2018, several units within the Ministry of Education have been cooperating more with each other. The closer cooperation is to some extent triggered by the ESP, as the annual planning and reporting are done against the six ESP domains, and this requires closer interactions between the units with activities under each domain. Six technical working groups, one for each ESP domain, were activated by the Ministry of Education in February 2020, in order to prepare the reports for the ESP annual review meeting in March 2020. Each technical working group includes 5-10 Ministry of Education staff from the units with activities under the group's domain.
- In 2014, the Queen Rania Foundation undertook a major situation analysis of teachers and their incentives. The Ministry of Education's unit responsible for teacher policies was unaware of this study. After its publication, the Ministry did not use the study findings. In 2019/20, after the Queen Rania Foundation's involvement in developing the ESP, the Foundation and the Ministry carried out a follow-up study on the first situation analysis, and this time it was a joint effort. The Queen Rania Foundation took into consideration what the Ministry wanted to know about teachers, and it was a joint launch. Because the Queen Rania Foundation and the Queen Rania Teacher Academy participated in the development of the ESP, they now have a better understanding of the direction of the sector and they are collaborating more closely with the Ministry. By being involved in the design of the ESP, the Queen Rania Foundation learned that they should contribute to the implementation of the ESP. The Ministry learned that the foundations are partners, not competitors, and that it is more fruitful to coordinate and work together.
- At the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, there was a broad consensus among all members of the Education Sector Working Group (ESWG) to maintain the ESP as the core reference document in planning the response to the crisis. The ESWG includes a wide range of NGOs and aid agencies working with humanitarian responses in Jordan. This was also the firm position of the Ministry of Education and the Donor Education Group. As a result, the Ministry's Education during Emergency Plan (EDEP) is not a separate stand-alone plan, but strongly linked

with the ESP. It is unusual that humanitarian actors refer to and use a national education sector plan as their reference document for planning. This shows the convening power of the ESP and its ability to bring all actors in the sector together, regardless of their organizational profile.

A few outcomes in Jordan³ also point to **changes in monitoring methods and procedures**, linked to the Ministry having the ESP as its main reference document. In particular, in order to be able to monitor the implementation of the ESP, those responsible for the EMIS have developed a comprehensive dashboard with 40 indicators. This was done just after the launch of the ESP in March 2018, with the dashboard presented and approved by the Ministry's senior management. A few interviewees shared that although there is room for improvement on some of the key performance indicators and the design of the annual review meetings, these are seen as important changes in sector monitoring resulting from the ESP. A senior ministry official said that *'the dashboard is a quantum leap for the Ministry, as for the first time we are able to put all the data on a big dashboard. It is available online and can be accessed by all decision-makers at different levels of the education system'*.

At the same time, it should be noted that the Ministry of Education's reporting procedures to the Economic Council (annually), to Cabinet (quarterly), and the Royal Court (annually) remain the same, in terms of timing and content. This means that the ESP annual review has not altered previous reporting procedures within the public administration but has added a monitoring step that brings together all key stakeholders for joint review and planning purposes.

Another aspect of the harvested outcomes in Jordan is that the majority of them (a total of ten) refer to changes at the organizational level. The described outcomes on coordination and monitoring procedures are examples of this. On the whole, this means that the changes are in one way or another about new arrangements in internal structures, processes, systems, or staffing in relation to the overall purpose and objectives of the educational administration. Far fewer changes are recorded at the institutional/regulatory level and the individual capacity level. At the individual level, only one outcome statement can be clearly classified as such. Two interviewees shared the same example of how they have continued to apply strategic planning following the approach used with IIEP for the formulation of the ESP. They referred to the COVID-19 crisis and said that to identify priorities and objectives, they started with a brief analysis of the situation and then moved to the setting of objectives, sub-objectives, and activities. Distance learning was defined as a priority, and a plan has been drafted for its expansion, including indicators for monitoring purposes.

In Guinea, on the other hand, the recorded changes are mainly identified at the institutional level. By institutional capacity, is meant the formal rules, such as laws, regulations and policies that provide the framework within which organizations and people, in this case the Guinean educational administration, operate.

A notable change in Guinea has been the adoption of a new government regulation in April 2020 that clarifies the responsibilities of the different ministerial units involved in education sector planning and monitoring. The ESA, which included a chapter on the functioning of the administration, showed that the roles of the different actors involved in the planning process were not well defined. Following this analysis, the national team that developed the sector plan suggested that each of the three ministries' planning departments (*les Bureaux de stratégie et de développement*, BSD, in French) would be responsible for the whole planning process within their ministries. The annual planning steps are now

³ Outcome statements no 1, 6, 9, 19, 20, and 21 in Annex C.

done more efficiently because the process is better defined and structured. Prior to the formulation of ProDEG, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) unit played a much more important role in the preparation of the annual plans of the ministries, and the BSDs of the ministries criticized the MTEF for playing their role. This is no longer the case today, and the unit now has a clear role in the consolidation of the plans and in sector monitoring/piloting.

Just prior to this new government regulation, in March 2020, the three ministers in charge of education and training created the Permanent Technical Secretariat of ProDEG by joint order. The Secretariat consists of six executives, two from each ministry of the sector, and a Permanent Secretary responsible for coordinating the implementation of ProDEG. The Technical Secretariat is a permanent structure, anchored in the Guinean civil service and comprising executives from the three ministries. This is an important change, as the previous structure was a structure parallel to the public administration.

In Guinea, the ESP preparation also gave strong emphasis to the updating of the financial simulation model. This work started during the ESA part of IIEP's support and continued during the preparation of ProDEG. Since the finalization of the 'cost and financing' chapter of ProDEG by mid-2019, the ProDEG Secretariat continues to use the plan's financial simulation model. It has since been used to update the projections for the three-year action plan and to prepare the 2020 and 2021 state budgets. The use of the simulation model means that the programming of year 1 (2020–2021) and year 2 (2021–2022) of the ProDEG implementation is of better quality. There is now expertise within the BSDs of the three ministries and the ProDEG secretariat to update/adjust the data and parameters of the sector plan.

Contribution of IIEP

In Jordan, IIEP's contribution to the ESP's positive effects on sector coordination and monitoring capacities was largely indirect; Through the Institute's technical advice on the structuring of the ESP and the coaching approach used for the production of the plan. IIEP's guidance on the content of chapter 5, which details the monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the implementation of the plan was mentioned by several interviewees as particularly important.

In Guinea, IIEP's contribution to the recent changes in the institutional framework that defines the planning process has been more direct: it was through IIEP's technical support to the realization of the sector analysis (in particular the institutional analysis) and to the sector plan that confusions over responsibilities in the planning process were identified and resolved. Several interviewees point to the value of IIEP's facilitation of this analysis, as well as discussions with the key stakeholders involved to make the change occur. Similarly, IIEP's contributions to the use of the updated simulation model after the validation of the ESP was also direct and substantial. Prior to the work on the sector analysis and plan, 12 staff also attended the IIEP's Sector Policy Training Programme in Dakar. This training gave them a solid understanding of the sector planning process and skills in financial simulations. As a result, when work on ProDEG began, this group of managers was already familiar with the concepts and techniques of strategic planning. Some of these 12 managers are responsible for budget programming in the education sector, either in one of the three ministries or at the ProDEG secretariat.

3.2. Evaluation question 2: What were IIEP's contributions to technical and political leadership?

Strengthening of ministries' technical leadership in educational planning is essential to IIEP's overall capacity development strategy. The implicit theory of change is also that stronger technical leadership throughout the planning cycle will influence and make it easier for the political leadership to lead and steer the sector.

In Jordan, the harvested outcomes point to a distinct change path in which **the Ministry of Education's Policy and Strategic Planning Directorate has taken on a stronger coordinating role**, following its major involvement in the ESP preparation in 2017. Several outcomes show how the Directorate, through the coordinating and leadership role it played in the plan preparation process, has gained in legitimacy to act and coordinate the sector. In total, nine of the 28 outcome statements are direct or indirect examples of this leadership aspect, within the Ministry as well as in relation to external partners.⁴

A prominent sign of the stronger leadership role of the Policy and Strategic Planning Directorate has been the annual review exercises, led and presented by the Directorate. Since the launch of the Jordan ESP in March 2018, the Ministry of Education has organized two annual review meetings on the implementation of the ESP, one in February 2019 and one in March 2020. The first meeting in February 2019 was a short presentation that gathered about 50 key stakeholders while the second meeting in March 2020 lasted for two days and included approximately 200 participants. This year's review meeting allowed for several presentations and discussions about key achievements and remaining challenges and the collective development of the ESP annual work plans. These types of comprehensive annual review meetings including a broad range of stakeholders did not happen in the immediate period before the ESP.⁵ The participants in this year's review meeting included a wide range of stakeholders, including Ministry of Education staff, donors, UN agencies, NGOs (international and royal NGOs), and other ministry representatives.

Several interviewees pointed out that, since the ESP endorsement, the Planning Directorate's stewardship has helped to create greater coherence in the Ministry of Education's decision-making and planning process, in alignment with the stated ESP objectives. One example provided was when the Director of Planning in April 2020 got involved in the discussion and in decisions on the type of data to be collected for the monitoring of the major School and Directorate Development Programme. This Programme is managed by the Training Directorate, but the Department of Planning plays a role in ensuring that the data collected on the programme are useful for the whole Ministry's monitoring and steering of the sector. The interviewee who provided this example stressed that these types of interactions between the Planning Directorate and Technical Directorates are more common now.

The data reveal two main facilitating conditions that made it possible for the planning Directorate to play its role in a more forceful way. First, the then Minister of Education showed a personal interest in planning and saw the need for improved planning processes within his ministry. The data reveal several major initiatives taken by the Minister in 2017 to strengthen the educational planning capacity of the Ministry. Noticeable initiatives included the establishing of a new school mapping and GIS [Geographic Information System] unit within the Ministry of Education in July 2017, as well as new recruitments of several statisticians to the planning Directorate. The school mapping unit did not exist before, and the

⁴ Outcome statements no 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 17, and 18 in Annex C.

⁵ The last ERfKE II [Education Reform for Knowledge Economy] annual review took place in early 2016.

lack of staff with statistical skills had been identified as a major capacity gap.⁶ The then Minister recognized the importance of a nationally led planning process to better define the overall direction for the education sector, aligned with the Government of Jordan's development vision. In early 2017, the Minister requested the preparation of a strategic plan for the pre-primary to upper-secondary education. Throughout the whole plan preparation, the Minister provided strong leadership to the process and allocated major resources and staff time to senior and technical staff from all ministerial departments for the development of the plan. Through these initiatives the Minister also ensured support from development partners (see section 3.3).

A second factor that has contributed to the Planning Directorate's strengthened leadership role has to do with the way in which the ESP was prepared. From mid-2017 to early 2018, the Ministry of Education staff developed the ESP themselves. The plan was not conceived by external consultants but by the Ministry itself. This was the first time that the strategic planning process was led and fully owned by the Ministry. The planning Directorate's legitimacy to coordinate the ESP implementation is closely linked to the widespread ownership of the document within the Ministry. As one senior Ministry official put it: *'Before, strategic planning was more handled by the World Bank and the donors but now we take care of this. We feel that we own this plan more than before. If donors stopped supporting us, then the ESP will still be there and we will continue to implement it because it is ours. We own it. Not anybody else. This has not been the case before. (...) There is also an issue with the frequent change of Ministers of Education in Jordan. Each time the new minister comes with a new vision, with new plans. This time it is different. New ministers should support the ESP. When we have had new ministers, we have said to them that we have our plan and that we should continue to work with it. The last time there was a change of minister, the Cabinet also expressed this and the Royal Court also came and said we should stick with the ESP.'*

The Ministry of Education involved a wide range of key stakeholders, including representatives from the Royal Court, the Queen Rania Foundation, the Queen Rania Teacher Academy, the teachers' union, students, parents, and donors, in the ESP preparation. During the five workshops organized from June to December 2017, all actors had a substantial say in the shaping of the ESP. In Jordan, it is unusual to have the Ministry of Education officials and representatives from the Royal entities, the teachers' union, students, parents and donors in the same room, working together. The Ministry team was very big. From the beginning of the ESP preparation to the end with the launch, around 50 people worked together. As a result, since then staff from all ministry directorates and departments, as well as other key stakeholders, support and defend the ESP.

In Guinea, four of the nine harvested outcomes point to changes in leadership linked to the work on the ESP/ProDEG. These changes show how the technical work on the plan was used by the political leadership to advance the work in the education sector. They also show the gains of coordination across the three education ministries for achieving results:

- The Inter-ministerial Steering and Coordination Committee (CIPC) validated the ProDEG on 9 October 2019. With regular meetings of the CIPC, the preparation and validation of ProDEG have been politically supported by the three sector Ministries.⁷ This committee, which at the political level is the only structure responsible for coordinating the sector, did not previously

⁶ The unit existed between 2003 and 2010, after which it was closed and some of its tasks were merged with the EMIS unit. In 2015, the EMIS unit was transferred to the Queen Rania Al Abdullah Center for Information Technology (QRC) and all school mapping tasks were suspended until 2017.

⁷ The Ministry of National Education and Literacy (MENA), the Ministry of Technical Education, Vocational Training, Employment and Labor (METFP-ET) and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESRS).

function. It is with the preparation of ProDEG that its functioning has been bolstered. During the preparation of ProDEG, the CIPC met several times for the political validation of the different stages. After the validation of ProDEG, this process of regular CIPC meetings has continued.

- The ProDEG formulated TVET as a new priority. It was the sector analysis and plan preparation processes, involving all three education ministries, that provided ample time for discussions in the national technical team, and consultations with key stakeholders that made it possible to define and communicate TVET as a strong national priority.
- In July 2020, the Prime Minister of Guinea announced a 20% increase in the 2021 budget allocations for the education sector compared to 2020, with explicit mention of TVET as a national priority. In the first months of 2020, the three sector ministries and their key development partners advocated for greater mobilization of domestic resources for education to the Prime Minister and finance ministries. The main argument was that they now had a unified sector plan and that to achieve its ambitious targets an increase in the share of the national budget allocated to education was necessary. It is yet to be seen whether the announcement will be followed through in practice.

Contribution of IIEP

One of IIEP's signatures is its participatory approach of guiding and facilitating the work of national teams. The data from Jordan and Guinea identify this approach as one among several factors that have directly contributed to the outcomes on leadership and ownership outlined above. In both Jordan and Guinea, interviewees repeatedly pointed to IIEP's approach as unique, expressing appreciation for the Institute's way of working with them. Such comments include:

'Without IIEP's working method, the process of identifying the ESP priorities would have looked very different and would have been less sustainable. It was an inclusive process that created ownership' (Senior Ministry official in Jordan).

'The originality in the development of the ESP was that, although the national team was accompanied by IIEP, its experts never imposed their choices on the team. The strategic choices were entirely proposed to decision-makers by the national team' (Senior Ministry official in Guinea).

In terms of enabling participatory ESP processes, several interviewees in both countries identified the initial stage of setting up the national ESP teams as particularly important. In Jordan, UNESCO (IIEP together with the UNESCO Amman office) played a critical role in advocating for an inclusive and participatory approach of developing the ESP, in particular by insisting on representation from a broad range of key stakeholders during IIEP's scoping mission in May 2017. In Guinea, IIEP pointed to the importance of having members from all three education ministries represented in the national technical team and indicated the preferred numbers and profiles of team members prior to the government's nomination of the national team in January 2019. The governments in both Jordan and Guinea took on board IIEP's advice on the composition of the national teams, which in turn made it possible for IIEP to work in accordance with its principles.

3.3. Changes in government development partner relationships

In both Jordan and Guinea, the plan preparation processes were intimately linked with and weaved into existing government-donor relationships. From the outset, the design of this evaluation did not consider any specific evaluation question on this topic. Yet, in both countries, the analysis of the harvested outcomes revealed a distinct group of changes related to the ways in which development partners interact with the ministries of education. These changes were not foreseen at the design stage of the evaluation.

In Jordan and in Guinea, the harvested outcomes point to changes in the way in which some key development partners align their support to national priorities and administrative and financial systems.

In Jordan, to better align with government's priorities, Canada and Italy turned to budget support for major parts of their funding and also substantially increased their financial contributions. Two interviewees shared that there was a time gap, from late 2016 when the major Education Reform for Knowledge Economy Project (ERfKE) had expired and the ESP had not yet been endorsed, when funding from donors became more fragmented with several parallel funding mechanisms. The validated ESP provided clear priorities to donors, including donors that were new to the sector and that initially targeted their support towards humanitarian needs. The ESP also brought 'old' donors back together and made it possible for them to align and increase their funding to government priorities. A visible example of this alignment was when the Minister of Education at the annual review meeting, in March 2020, indicated to the present donor representatives the different areas in the ESP that needed financing over the coming year.

Another effect of the joint endorsement of the ESP by the Ministry of Education and the local donor group in 2018 was that it led to a slightly simplified reporting process for the Ministry of Education towards some partners. Canada, Italy, and the EU use the Ministry's own report prepared for the annual review meeting, including the ESP key performance indicators (KPIs), as the key performance report from the education sector on the budget support.

In 2020, the Guinean government and three partners (Agence Française de Développement, Global Partnership for Education, and UNICEF) created the Common Fund for Education under the earmarked aid modality (the Fonds Commun d'Education/Budget d'Affectation Spéciale, FCE/BAS), which aligns with national administrative and financial procedures. The three partners announced their intention to provide a total of 62 million euros to this common fund to finance part of the implementation of ProDEG. The FCE/BAS aid modality makes it possible to federate the financing of the three partners around a single strategic vision and coherent educational policies (the ProDEG) by following national procedures. This mechanism constitutes a profound change compared to the previous sector plan. The 'project' modality used by these same partners for the 2014–2019 period, then called the Common Fund for Basic Education (FoCEB), was not aligned with the priorities of the entire education sector, but focused solely on basic education. In addition, the coordination and operational management of the previous sector plan was entrusted to a project management unit composed of contractual agents from outside the Guinean civil service.

Prior to ProDEG, when external funding was in project mode, the vast majority of resources to be programmed were focused on basic education. Consequently, the other two education ministries did not feel concerned. Now, in programme mode, each ministry has its own priority programmes and a dedicated budget envelope. The framework letter with guidelines for each ministry is common, and

ProDEG provides the common vision. This involvement of the three education ministries is new and aims to contribute to greater sector coherence.

Contribution of IIEP

In both Jordan and Guinea, the outcome statements show that IIEP's role was instrumental in ensuring the development of solid and well-structured plans, which in turn contributed to a sense of confidence from development partners in the usefulness of the plan documents for planning and implementation purposes.

The data point to IIEP's support to the identification and specification of the ESP KPIs during a week-long workshop in Jordan in August 2017 as being particularly useful. The monitoring of the set of 40 KPIs has been at the core of the two annual review meetings of the ESP implementation.

In Guinea, the start-up of the FCE/BAS was conditional on the finalization and validation of a strategic plan for the entire education sector, ProDEG. Without the development partners' endorsement of the sector plan, the FCE/BAS would not have come into being. IIEP's contribution to the formulation of ProDEG was essential to meet the conditions attached to this type of external financing, which is more flexible and more likely to produce effects at the scale of the education sector as a whole.

3.4. Evaluation question 3: Which strategies used by IIEP were effective, and which were not, in contributing to outcomes?

Overall, the collected data provide limited information on the relative effectiveness of IIEP's working strategies. The large majority of interviewees expressed great appreciation for IIEP's participatory and inclusive approach (as discussed in section 3.2.) and several noted that the different steps of developing a sector plan were on the whole well-conceived and well-functioning. However, despite the difficulties for most interviewees to assess or give examples that point to the pertinence of IIEP's pedagogical or technical approaches, a few were able to identify some areas for improvement. These comments include:

- *Bring in specialized expertise on high-priority policy areas:* In both Jordan and Guinea, interviewees noted that the particular strong point of the IIEP expertise which facilitated the work on the sector plans is in educational planning. While this was deemed essential and relevant, interviewees also saw a need to complement the IIEP team by mobilizing more specific expertise on high-priority policy topics, where external advice was needed. In Jordan, the topics of teacher careers and teacher performance frameworks were highlighted as examples. In Guinea, the ability for the national team to draw upon specialized expertise from IIEP Dakar on TVET was highlighted as a strong value added.
- *Provide additional support to weaker working groups:* In Jordan, two interviewees commented that IIEP should consider how to provide additional support to those groups and individuals that are not sufficiently equipped with planning skills. They saw a need not only to devote specific IIEP expertise to work more intensively with the weaker groups, but also to come in earlier with individual staff training on educational planning fundamentals, so that everyone is more on the same competency level once the work on the plan preparation starts.

- *The work on the financial simulation model to be done in a participatory way:* In Jordan, two interviewees noted that the work on the ESP simulation model was not conducted in the same way as were the other parts of the plan preparation process. Although IIEP experts consulted and, to some extent, worked with the Ministry of Education's finance unit, the work looked more like a traditional piece of consultancy. The work was conducted by IIEP and not by the Ministry and it was suggested that next time IIEP is to support a similar exercise in Jordan, the cost and financing part of the work should also be done by the Ministry, with IIEP in a support function. This is in sharp contrast to the way in which IIEP supported the updating of the simulation model in Guinea, where beneficiaries on the contrary expressed that the work was done in a highly participatory way and as on-the-job training over a longer period.
- *For greater effects, combine IIEP's plan preparation support with other IIEP support activities:* In both Jordan and Guinea, interviewees mentioned the value of combining IIEP's support to the development of the sector plan with other types of support. Suggested additional support activities included preparatory and refresher training in educational planning before the plan preparation starts, support from IIEP to conduct mid-term and end reviews of the ESP implementation and participation of some Ministry staff in specialized courses at IIEP. In Guinea, it was highlighted that the MENA has benefited from substantial training activities in educational planning, but that the two other ministries planning units are weaker and will need support in the coming years. In Jordan, the ongoing support from IIEP in crisis sensitive planning was highlighted as a good example of how to achieve even larger effects of IIEP's support services.

4. Learning considerations and points for discussion

4.1. Learning: ESP effects and IIEP contributions

The evaluation has documented a set of outcomes from the ESPs in Jordan (23 outcomes) and Guinea (9), as well as IIEP's contribution to those. This concluding section starts by summarizing the essence of these outcomes, after which a series of questions for further discussion are raised.

Key findings on educational planning and management capacities: Several outcomes show positive changes in how Jordan's Ministry of Education coordinates the sector, changes directly linked to having the ESP as a single reference document for sector planning. Some outcomes also point to improved capacities within the Ministry to monitor sector performance, most notably by organizing annual sector reviews and by working with an online dashboard for the monitoring of ESP implementation. Indirectly, IIEP contributed to the recorded outcomes by providing guidance on the structuring of the plan and the content of its M&E chapter. The quality of the plan document, assured by IIEP through advice and editing support, forms a good basis for the monitoring of the ESP implementation. While most of the harvested outcomes in Jordan concern organizational changes, those in Guinea are mostly about institutional and regulatory changes. In particular, this year a new regulation has defined the previously unclear responsibilities of the ministerial units involved in the planning process, an issue that was analysed, discussed, and defined in the ESP. IIEP played a strong facilitating role in the discussions as well as in the drafting of the institutional analysis and the ESP.

Key findings on leadership: The harvested outcomes in Jordan and in Guinea point to some positive effects of the ESP on sector leadership. In Jordan, the Planning Directorate, through the coordinating and leadership role it played in the plan preparation process and in the annual ESP reviews, has gained in legitimacy to act and coordinate the sector. In Guinea, the outcome statements show how the technical work on the ESP was used by the political leadership to advance jointly across the country's three education ministries. The renewed functioning of the inter-ministerial steering and coordination committee, the sole political body for sector coordination, and the formulation of TVET as a strong national priority are directly linked to the technical work on the ESP. In both countries, the outcome statements show that the IIEP method mattered for achieving leadership results. IIEP's participatory way of working made direct contributions to the education ministries' leadership of the plan.

Key findings on government-development partner relationships: As a result of the validation of the ESPs, two development partners in Jordan (Canada and Italy) and three in Guinea (France, GPE, and UNICEF) changed their aid modality to provide substantial parts of their financial contributions to the education sectors as budget support and pooled funding. The use of these aid modalities automatically means that the financial contributions are aligned with the ESP priorities and with the national administrative and financial systems. In Jordan, the aid disbursements from these partners and others also increased substantially following the ESP endorsement. In Guinea, the three key partners have stated their intention to increase their financial contributions. The pooled funding support is however conditional on the Guinean Government's own financial contribution to the education sector. As the agreed national contribution had not yet materialized, the first tranche of the pooled funding had, as of October 2020, not yet been disbursed. IIEP was instrumental in ensuring the development of solid sector plans, without which these development partners would not have changed their aid modalities.

Key findings on IIEP support strategies: It has not been possible to determine the relative effectiveness of the different support methods, tools, and strategies used by IIEP to contribute to outcomes. However, the one strategy that emerges most strongly is IIEP's participatory and inclusive approach of working, repeatedly highlighted as a strong value added of working with IIEP. At the same time, interviewees identified and suggested several areas for improvements, including bringing in specialized expertise on high-priority policy areas (Jordan and Guinea), providing additional support to weaker working groups (Jordan), conducting the work on the financial simulation model in a participatory way (Jordan), and more systematically combining IIEP's plan preparation support with other IIEP support activities (Jordan and Guinea).

Recommended points for discussion:

1. *How to best ensure the usefulness of ESPs for improving internal sector planning processes*

IIEP's technical cooperation is premised on its role in training and facilitating planning units to do their work better, including leading ministries' sector planning processes more effectively. This evaluation exercise has shown that the plan preparation processes in both Jordan and Guinea have led to several positive effects beyond IIEP's immediate control/responsibility. It has also shown that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to predict these effects beforehand.

In this context, one may ask how the sector plan that IIEP is to support fits into already existing planning and management processes in the ministry? In the case of Jordan, the then Minister of Education identified the need for a specific plan for his Ministry that could bring together various actors around a joint vision. In Guinea, the need for a sector-wide approach that brought together the three education ministries was presented as a strong argument for the preparation of the ESP. The harvested outcomes do point to positive results of this intention in both countries. However, several less positive and unintended effects of these ESPs do also appear. In Jordan, a clear expectation from the Ministry of Education was that the sector monitoring and reporting procedures would be simplified as a result of having the ESP. Yet, this does not seem to be the case, as the annual review has added another layer of reporting requirements. Why is this and what can be learned?

In Guinea, the situation is more complicated. Due to a combination of political, institutional and COVID-19-related constraints, the actual implementation of the ESP has not yet started. To a large extent, it appears as if the implementation of the ESP relies on the functioning of the new aid modality. What conclusions can be drawn from this?

In both Jordan and Guinea, a core group of development partners are eager to support improved sector planning practices, and this motivated the financial support to IIEP for the preparation of the ESPs. The governments in both countries clearly perceive the sector plans as instruments for external financial mobilization. In this context, how can IIEP ensure that it works for the ministry and for improving internal planning and management procedures? Is it the case that ESPs are not always the best planning tool to improve internal procedures? What responsibility does IIEP have to assess this issue before embarking on a support to a new ESP?

Other questions, under this broad question, include:

- ❖ Early on, before committing to an ESP, should IIEP introduce a routine with a formal discussion with ministries' senior management about what type of support is most useful for improving technical leadership and capacities in educational planning? Many

development partners work with Country Support Strategies to plan their support over several years, based on analysis of how they can make the most difference. Should IIEP do the same and in this way allow for ESPs to be integrated into longer-term engagements?

- ❖ To what extent are the suggested improvement areas worth pursuing (e.g. including specialized policy expertise in the IIEP team, providing additional support to weaker groups, providing more extensive capacity development on financial simulation models, and more systematically combining IIEP's support to an ESP with other support activities)?
- ❖ Would it be worth making systematic follow-up missions one year after the end of IIEP's support to an ESP, to assess the situation and to prospect?

2. *How to best promote participatory ways of collaboration*

The harvested outcomes show that IIEP's participatory way of developing the ESPs with key stakeholders in Jordan and Guinea has had direct effects on sector leadership. Clearly, the ways in which IIEP respects, pays strong attention to, and works with (and not for) national technical teams is a precious asset. IIEP is primarily a technical and not a financial partner and to some extent this explains the room its experts have to work in this participatory way. A major constraint for ministries' planning effectiveness, however, is that many external partners do not work in this way, including development partners, NGOs, and consultancy firms. Should IIEP communicate the advantages of participatory approaches to other external stakeholders? Should it consider specific training activities on this topic?

At the same time, IIEP's technical cooperation is frequently put under pressure to deliver high-quality products when the partner that is financing IIEP shows a stronger interest in the product than in the participatory process. What is the bottom line for IIEP's engagement when from the beginning it is clear that the participatory process and capacity development approach that is the DNA of IIEP will be minimal? What safeguards or protocols could be put in place at IIEP to justify the Institute in turning down such requests?

Two other related questions are:

- ❖ Jordan's plan preparation process involved a large group of Ministry staff and other key stakeholders and this proved beneficial for the national sustainability and ownership of the ESP document. How common has it been to work with such big groups on other ESPs supported by IIEP and has it been as beneficial as in Jordan in terms of ownership and leadership? Should IIEP consider using this approach more widely?
- ❖ In Jordan and Guinea, IIEP provided advice on the composition of the national teams and advocated for inclusive and wide representation of different stakeholders. Whenever a country asks for advice on this topic, would it be worth preparing a short briefing note that can be shared and that explains the rationale for this approach and what it implies?

4.2. Learning: the outcome harvesting method

At the outset of this evaluation, it was uncertain if it would be at all possible to identify outcomes linked to IIEP's support to the two ESP processes. In hindsight, the exercise has shown that this was indeed possible, and several changes and 'ESP effects' were revealed in both Jordan and Guinea. Overall, it is certainly of value for IIEP to document these effects – for accountability purposes, but also for internal learning. The outcome harvesting method has not only offered a way for IIEP to better

document the effects of its work but could also offer a way to manage knowledge and learn from complex and difficult-to-monitor development processes. The method is particularly valuable for capturing unintended effects of ESPs.

At the same time, this pilot exercise has shown what the outcome harvesting method can and cannot offer. In particular, the method has not proven helpful for assessing learning design issues such as the choice of pedagogical method and support tools. Hence, when IIEP is interested in evaluating the pertinence of different pedagogical aspects, such as facilitation methods and workshop modalities, other evaluation methods should be used. In addition, the harvested 'outcome bites' are not exhaustive and do not tell the whole 'story'. In particular, the extent to which these changes will be sustained over time goes beyond the remit of the work.

Recommended points for discussion:

- How can this pilot exercise best be taken forward within IIEP? Would it be feasible to each year select a limited number of projects/themes to be evaluated through similar exercises?
- Should IIEP also consider how to further expand the use of outcome harvesting as a monitoring method during implementation (i.e. not only retrospective evaluations)? If so how?

Annex A: Overview of the evaluation design and process

In accordance with the outcome harvesting methodology, the evaluation work included the following main steps:

1. *Harvest design* (June 2020): In early June, a user committee with seven members⁸ led by Anna Haas from the technical cooperation team was established to shape and coordinate the evaluation on behalf of IIEP-UNESCO. The initial work also included the selection of appropriate and feasible ESP case studies. There was agreement to conduct an internal evaluation so to maximize the Institute's own learning, but that the work would be supported by external outcome harvesting expertise. At this stage, it was also decided that the external expertise would conduct the substantiation of the outcomes.

Mid-June, a virtual design workshop was organized to refresh the participants' knowledge about the method, identify the uses and users of the evaluation findings, formulate the evaluation questions and draw up the work plan.

2. *Review of documents* (June): This short phase included a review of relevant project documents, most notably including IIEP back to office reports and implementation reports in relation to the selected education sector plan cases and the drafting of some preliminary outcomes statements. Due to the limited number of existing documents, this was a light step.
3. *Engagement with human sources* (July-September): The dialogue with the most knowledgeable persons about the plan preparation cases was a critical part of the exercise. This was the step that allowed the identification and formulation of outcomes.

In Jordan, key informant interviewees were conducted with nine senior officials and four development partners with knowledge about the ESP plan preparation process. In Guinea, five senior officials and two development partners were interviewed. For Guinea, it was at the outset planned to conduct interviews with five more persons. However, during the initial set of interviews it became clear that interviewees largely identified the same or similar outcomes. It was therefore not deemed useful to continue with more interviews. One possible reason for the relatively limited number of outcomes in Guinea is that the ESP implementation has yet to start. The evaluators also discussed with the four persons that were most heavily involved in the work from the IIEP side, two for Jordan and two for Guinea. The list of interviewees are found at the end of this annex.

After each interview, the harvested outcome descriptions were further refined and then sent back to the interviewees for clarifications and verification. All interviewees responded and in about half of the cases further improved the outcome descriptions. Throughout this essential

⁸ The members of the user committee were Anna Haas, Dorian Gay, Anton de Grauwe, Anna Seeger, Lynne Bethke, Goele Scheers and Conny Hoitink.

process, special care was given to formulating outcomes that concern observable facts that are specific and concrete enough to be verified.

4. *Substantiation of the outcomes* (October-November): To enhance the validity and the credibility of the findings, the external outcome harvesting expert sent just over half of the outcomes descriptions (12 of the 23 harvested outcomes in Jordan and 5 of the 9 in Guinea) to two substantiators with knowledge about the outcomes in each of the two countries (one substantiator from the government side and one from the development partners side in each country). The substantiators verified the accuracy of the formulated outcome descriptions by rating their degree of agreement with the outcome descriptions and by providing written comments. All four substantiators responded and substantiated a total of 16 outcomes. The substantiators fully agreed with 3 of the outcome descriptions and partially agreed with 13. The one outcome that was not substantiated (no 7 in annex C) has not been included in the analysis. Where relevant, the outcomes were slightly revised based on the substantiators' comments.
5. *Analysis and interpretation* (October-November): This step included the organization and analysis of the harvested data so that the initially defined evaluation questions could be answered. The analysis made it possible to show what has been achieved, but also to draw conclusions about the implications of those achievements. The analysis was shared and discussed with the user committee, after which the evaluation report was finalized.
6. *Support the use of findings* (October 2020 – January 2021): The final step shaped the presentation of the findings to those who will use them. In particular, this included thinking through and synthesizing findings for different audiences, including IIEP staff supporting the formulation of education sector plans and providing appropriate input to IIEP's 2020 Governing Board report.

Jordan interviews:

Dr Najwa Dheifallah	Secretary General for Administrative and Financial Affairs, Ministry of Education (MoE)
Dr Yousef Abu Sha'ar	Director of Planning, MoE
Dr Hafs Abu Mallouh	Director of Teacher Policies/ Supervision and Educational Training Management, MoE
Engineer Safa' Al Bairouti (Mrs)	Head of GIS unit, MoE
Mrs Shauna Flanagan	Canadian CIDA
Mr Ali Mahasees	E-learning management department/ Queen Rania Center for Education and Information Technology
Mrs Constanza Farina	UNESCO Amman
Mrs Marina Patrier	UNESCO Amman
Dr Raed Elewa	Former Head of the EQAU

Mrs Camille Bouillon Begin	Education Specialist CIDA
Mr Abdullah Hassouneh	Acting Director of Policy and Strategic Planning/ Planning and Educational Research Management, MoE
Dr Yaser Al Omari	Head of Educational Research Department, MoE
Mr Hisham Abu Khashabeh	Head of Finance, MoE
Mrs Leonora MacEwen	Programme Specialist, IIEP-UNESCO
Mrs Lynne Bethke	Consultant, IIEP-UNESCO

Jordan substantiators:

Mrs Lama Al-Natour, Head of the Ministry of Education's Donor Coordination Unit

Mrs Ines Alves, Education programme manager, European Commission in Jordan

Guinea interviews

Dr Baba DIANE	DG/DNETFP, METFP-ET
Monsieur Sayon CAMARA	MENA
Monsieur Oumar SY	MENA, CDMT
Dr Djénabou Baldé (Mme)	MESRS
Monsieur Ibrahima Kalil CAMARA	MENA, CDMT
Monsieur Moussa DOUMBOUYA	AFD
Monsieur Thierno Ibrahima DIALLO	GIZ
Dr Anton de Grauwe	Chef de la Cooperation Technique, UNESCO-IIEP
Monsieur Jean-Claude Ndabananiye	Spécialiste de Programme, UNESCO-IIEP

Guinea substantiators:

Dr Abdoul Karim DIALLO, Conseiller MESRS

Monsieur Hassimiou DIALLO, AFD

Annex B: Uses and users of the evaluation findings

USES	PRIMARY USERS			SECONDARY USERS		
	TC Team Paris Programme professionals involved in ESA-ESP	TC Head	Director's office M&E function	IIEP board	IIEP Staff	IIEP Mngt team
1. To learn about the usefulness of ESPs (process and product) and learning about IIEP's technical support. Both elements can serve to improve the design of IIEP support to Education Sector Plan development.	X	X	X		X	
2. To enrich the IIEP training and research themes and strategy.		X			X	X
3. Accountability to Member States and donors, IIEP board, general public. Starting with annual year report mid-October.		X	X	X		X
4. Learn about whether and how the outcome harvesting method is useful for IIEP.	X	X	X		X	X
5. Share findings with others (donors, Member States, IIEP board, general public) to convince them about the value of our work.		X	X	X		X

Annex C: Harvested outcomes in Jordan and Guinea

		Outcome description	Significance of the outcome	Contribution of IIEP
1.	Jordan	<p>Since the launch of the Jordan ESP in March 2018, the Ministry of Education has organized two annual review meetings on the implementation of the ESP, one in February 2019 and one in March 2020. The first meeting in February 2019 was a short presentation that gathered about 50 key stakeholders while the second meeting in March 2020 lasted for two days and included approximately 200 participants. This year's review meeting allowed for several presentations, longer discussions about key achievements and remaining challenges and the collective development of the ESP annual work plans.</p>	<p>These types of comprehensive annual review meetings including a broad range of stakeholders did not happen in the immediate period before the ESP. The last ERfKE II [the Education Reform for Knowledge Economy] annual review took place in early 2016. The participants in this year's review meeting included a wide range of MOE staff, donors, UN agencies, NGOs (international and royal NGOs), and representatives from other ministries like the Ministry of Labour.</p> <p>It should be noted that the Ministry of Education's reporting procedures to the Economic Council (annually), to Cabinet (quarterly) and the Royal Court (annually) remain the same, in terms of timing and content. This means that the ESP annual review has not altered previous reporting procedures within the public administration but have added a monitoring step that brings together all key stakeholders for joint review and planning purposes.</p>	<p>IIEP-UNESCO provided advice on the structuring of the plan, including the M&E framework. The plan's chapter 3 and 5 state that annual review meetings should take place. The quality of the plan document forms a good basis for the review meetings. The UNESCO Amman office provided valuable support to the realization of the second annual review meeting and the development of the annual work plans.</p>

2.	Jordan	The Ministry of Education involved a wide range of key stakeholders, including representatives from the Royal Court, the Queen Rania Foundation, the Queen Rania Teacher Academy, the teachers' union, students, parents and donors, in the preparation of Jordan's 2018-2022 Education Strategic Plan. During the five workshops organized from June to December 2017, with each workshop lasting for an average of three days, all actors had a substantial say in the shaping of the ESP.	It is unusual to have the Ministry of Education officials and representatives from the Royal entities, the teachers' union, students, parents and donors in the same room, working together in the same room.	UNESCO (IIEP together with the UNESCO Amman office), played a critical role in advocating for this inclusive and participatory approach of developing the ESP, insisting on representation from a broad range of key stakeholders.
3.	Jordan	Following the national validation of the ESP in Jordan in March 2018, several donors increased their financial contributions to the education sector. This was the case for Canada, the EU, Italy and the World Bank. To better align their funding to government's priorities, Canada and Italy turned to budget support for major parts of their funding.	There was a time gap, from late 2016 when the ERfKE had expired and the ESP had not yet been endorsed, when funding from donors became more fragmented with several parallel funding mechanisms. The ESP provided clear priorities to donors, including donors that were new to the sector and that initially targeted their support towards humanitarian needs. The ESP also brought 'old' donors back together and made it possible for them to align and increase their funding to government priorities. The ESP was crucial for providing a common reference for alignment and coordination, but to some extent fragmentation still exists.	IIEP-UNESCO was instrumental in ensuring the development of a solid and well-structured plan, which in turn contributed to a sense of confidence from donors in the usefulness of the plan document for planning and implementation purposes.
4.	Jordan	Since the launch of the ESP in March 2018, the Ministry of Education's Planning Department is taking on a stronger role, within the Ministry as well as in relation to external actors. One example of this is that the annual report exercises are led and presented by the Planning Department. A second example is that just after the launch of the ESP, the Secretary General appointed a new team of statisticians to the Planning Department.	The ESP has contributed to a stronger role for the Ministry of Education's Planning Department, which helps to steer the MOE decisions in the right direction, aligned with the objective of the ESP. Together, the ESP and the stronger Planning Department provides greater coherence to the Ministry of Education's decision-making and policy planning process.	The Planning Department was heavily involved in the plan preparation process and through the role it played in the preparation of the ESP, it acquired the legitimacy to act and coordinate afterwards. UNESCO (the Amman office and IIEP) worked with the Planning department, asserting its' leadership role in the plan preparation process.

5. Jordan		<p>Since the launch of the ESP in March 2018, some units within the Ministry of Education are cooperating more with each other. The closer cooperation is triggered by the ESP, as the annual planning and reporting are done against the six ESP domains and this require closer interactions between the units with activities under each domain.</p>	<p>Before the launch of the ESP, several of the Ministry of Education units largely worked separately from each other, in silos. This is less so now. The Department of Planning plays a critical role in ensuring that the work of technical departments is aligned with the ESP and that data collected are useful not only for the department that manages a certain programme but also for overall policy and decision making for the Ministry as a whole. For instance, in April 2020 the Department of Planning got involved in the discussion and decisions on the type of data to be collected for monitoring of the School and Directorate Development Programme. This Programme is managed by the Training Directorate, but the Department of Planning plays a role in ensuring that the data collected on the programme are useful for the whole Ministry.</p>	<p>IIEP-UNESCO's principles and approach of working, by making key stakeholders identify their own policy priorities, their own coordination approach and their own monitoring approach. Without IIEP's working method, the identification process would have looked very different and would have been less sustainable. It was an inclusive process that created ownership.</p>
6.	Jordan	<p>The six technical working groups, one for each ESP domain, were activated by the Ministry of Education in February 2020, in order to prepare the reports for the ESP annual review meeting in March 2020. Each technical working group includes 5-10 Ministry of Education staff from the units with activities under the group's domain.</p>	<p>The activation of the technical working groups is important for the effective implementation of the ESP. Several development partners emphasize that the establishing of the technical working groups represents a first step in activating the ESP coordination and partnership structure, in accordance with the ESP chapter 5.</p>	<p>No direct contribution from UNESCO IIEP, but the Institute provided guidance to the writing of chapter 5 that specifies the role of the technical working groups. The UNESCO Amman office provides supports for an improved coordination and partnership structure of the ESP, for instance through inputs to the TORs for the policy, planning and coordination body and the technical working groups.</p>

7.*	Jordan	The endorsement of the ESP in 2018 made it possible for the Ministry of Education to better integrate refugees in the normal planning and management of the education sector. The ESP integrates and mainstreams the education needs of vulnerable Jordanians and refugees.	The Ministry of Education's ESP states all children's right to education in Jordan thus avoiding any distinction or delineation by status or nationality. In addition, by its very nature, the ESP differs from a humanitarian appeal, as it is a strategic planning tool defining the medium-term national education priorities in a comprehensive way. This is in contrast to the humanitarian appeal in Jordan, which first is a tool to mobilize external funding from donors and that focus on the immediate needs of those affected.	IIEP-UNESCO promoted this change in approach, mainly by putting forward the SDG4 as the point of departure for the formulation of policy priorities.
*Not substantiated				
8.	Jordan	The Ministry of Education constantly refers to the ESP as THE document that guides its' work. In 2020, this has been the case at several key occasions, including with the development of the annual work plans with the technical working groups in March 2020 and now in July 2020 with the revision of those work plans by the Ministry of Education in light of the pandemic.	The fact that different key officials from the Ministry of Education frequently make reference to the ESP is a strong sign of the importance of the document in the national discourse.	IIEP-UNESCO's contribution to the Ministry's current use of the ESP document is indirect, through its' technical advice to formulation of a high quality plan.
9.	Jordan	Since the joint endorsement of the ESP by the Ministry of Education and the local donor group in 2018, Canada, Italy and the EU rely heavily on the Ministry of Education's own reporting on the ESP KPIs for the Government of Jordan's reporting to these partners.	The ESP has led to some simplifications in the reporting process for the Ministry of Education towards some partners.	IIEP-UNESCO supported the Ministry of Education in developing the KPIs in August 2018, during a week-long workshop.
10.	Jordan	At the outbreak of the COVID-crisis in 2020, there was a broad consensus among all members of the Education Sector Working Group (ESWG) to keep the ESP as the core reference document in the planning of the response to the crisis. This was also the firm position of the Ministry of Education and the Donor Education Group. As a result, the Ministry's Education During Emergency (EDEP) is not a separate stand-alone plan, but strongly linked with the ESP.	The Education Sector Working Group includes a wide range of NGOs and aid agencies working with humanitarian responses in Jordan. It is unusual that humanitarian actors refer to and use a national education sector plan as their reference document for planning. This shows the strong convening power of the ESP and its' ability to bring all actors in the sector together, regardless of their organizational profile.	IIEP-UNESCO's contribution to this is indirect, through its' technical advice on the content of the ESP and the coaching approach used for the writing of the plan. The UNESCO Amman office played a central role in supporting coordination during COVID-19, in the donor education group and in the ESWG.

11.	Jordan	During the COVID-19 crisis, the Jordan Ministry of Education suggested a review of the ESP where the focal points for the different domains will get together to review and adjust/revise the ESP targets in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.	This is a clear sign that the Ministry sees the ESP as a key document for the steering of the education sector.	The MOE requested UNESCO to help with this review, with IIEP joining the UNESCO Amman office in several webinars to discuss the issue and draft a proposal. UNESCO stressed that adjusting the ESP is the right way forward, rather than to put too much time and effort into the development of the separate COVID response plan.
12.	Jordan	From mid-2017 to early 2018, the Ministry of Education staff prepared the ESP themselves. The plan was not conceived and designed by external consultants but by the Ministry itself. This was the first time that the strategic planning process was led and fully owned by the Ministry. The Minister provided strong leadership to the process and allocated major resources and staff time to senior and technical staff from all ministerial departments for the development of the plan.	Ministry staff express a strong ownership of the ESP. Strategic planning in the Ministry of Education is not new and there have been several plans and strategic planning processes in the past. However, these plans and processes were managed by donors and written by external consultants. With the ESP, the Ministry is fully in charge and takes care of the strategic planning itself. This is new.	UNESCO (Amman office and IIEP) supported staff at different levels, technical, senior and the Minister himself in shaping the Ministry's vision for the five-year plan. IIEP-UNESCO provided technical guidance in the different steps of the process. The way that the IIEP-UNESCO team worked with the Ministry was new to them. It was a very big team from the Ministry. From the beginning of the ESP preparation to the end with the launch, around 50 people worked together. As a result, staff from all directorates and departments stand for and defend the ESP. IIEP helped establish a culture of strategic planning and of teamwork within the Ministry, through its coaching approach.
13.	Jordan	During the ESP annual review in March 2020, the Minister indicated to the present donor representatives the different areas in the ESP that needs financing over the coming year.	The ESP brings all key actors together under the leadership of the Minister himself. It is by working with a comprehensive education plan that we can discuss and get an overview of the needs in the sector. The plan gives the Minister a good tool to lead.	No direct contribution from UNESCO IIEP, but the gathering of everyone around the six ESP domains and the projects and activities within each domain is useful. IIEP was helpful in setting up this structure. The UNESCO Amman office helped in the organization of the annual review and in following up on the review recommendations, including the improved ESP coordination and partnership structure.

14.	Jordan	<p>In the beginning of 2020, a big international NGO presented a new project on teachers' well-being of 5 million JOD to the Ministry of Education, financed by a major bilateral donor. In the initial project from the NGO, what the NGO suggested was not using Ministry standards, did not follow the Ministry's approach and was not included in the Human Resource Domain of the ESP's annual work plan. Before the ESP, it is likely that the Ministry would have said yes to this programme anyway. This time, because of the specified projects and activities in the ESP the Ministry said to this NGO that they should contribute to the projects inside the Human Resources domain. It took the Ministry six months to discuss and review and agree on the revised content of the project from the NGO to finance one part of the work under the Human Resources domain on Teacher Ethics.</p>	<p>The Ministry of Education has used the ESP to be able to say no to some donor initiatives. To say that according to the ESP the Ministry needs support in this particular area, not in that or that area coming from a donor. This is good, because it is not the individual Ministry staff saying no but the Ministry's 'mother document', the ESP.</p>	<p>Indirect contribution from IIEP in facilitating the development of the plan document.</p>
15.	Jordan	<p>In 2014, the Queen Rania Foundation undertook a study on teachers. It was a situation analysis of teachers and their incentives. We in the Ministry who work on teacher policies did not know at all that this study was happening. After the launch and after they had published the study, we did not consider how we could benefit from that study. This time, after their involvement in developing the ESP, we have done a follow up study on the first study and this time we did the study together. The Queen Rania Foundation took into consideration what we wanted to know about teachers and when they launched the results we were together in that.</p>	<p>Because the Queen Rania Foundation and the Queen Rania Teacher Academy participated in the development of the ESP, they now have a better understanding of the direction of the sector and we collaborate better with them. By being involved in the design of the ESP, the Queen Rania Foundation learned that they should contribute to the implementation of the ESP. We in the Ministry learned that they are good stakeholders, not competitors, but that it is best to work together.</p>	<p>Indirect contribution from IIEP in promoting the involvement of a wide range of key stakeholders in the development of the ESP.</p>

16.	Jordan	After my participation in the UKFIET conference in September 2019, I communicated with one of the experts. I was in the process of designing the ranking system for teachers in Jordan and I was particularly impressed by one expert, called Mr Martin, so I contacted him after the conference to get some advice and he sent me materials and some studies.	The ESP has given us new windows to look outside the Ministry of Education, to look at different international initiatives. Now, because I have participated in several international events, when I need advice or an expert I can just go to my pocket and find who I need in my collection of business cards.	Thanks to financial support from IIEP and from some other donors, I have been able to go to some international conferences and present what we are doing. For example the UKFIET conference in 2019. We have also participated in the CIES conference in the US.
17.	Jordan	In July 2017, during the preparation of the ESP, the Minister of Education and the former Head of the Planning Department established a new school mapping and GIS [Geographic Information System] unit within the Ministry of Education. This unit did not exist before. The unit existed between 2003 – 2010, after which it was closed and some of its' tasks were merged with the EMIS unit. In 2015, the EMIS unit was transferred to the Queen Rania Al Abdullah Center for Information Technology (QRC) and all school mapping tasks were suspended until 2017.	The creation of the Ministry of Education's new GIS unit was a sign of the prominence given to the school mapping planning tool. The reactivation of this unit within the Ministry contributes to determine the establishing of new school buildings, additional classes and kindergarten wards. Due to population growth and many refugee students, overcrowded classrooms is common in Jordan. To ensure the right to quality education for all residents in the Kingdom, the GIS unit contributes to the dismantling the two-shift system and fewer rented school buildings. These efforts go hand in hand with the high ambitions and targets set in the ESP on building 60 new schools per year.	IIEP-UNESCO did not contribute to the establishing of the school mapping/GIS unit. However, the content of the ESP provided a clear roadmap for the work of the new unit, as it identified activities and targets directly linked to the unit's responsibilities.
18.	Jordan	The GIS unit has been able to attract significant external funding since the launch of the ESP in 2018.	When the new GIS unit was established, it faced many challenges, including poor information technology infrastructure (specialized hardware and software) and capacity gaps among the unit's employees. The ESP stated this challenge and the plan has helped to attract funding from external partners to improve the IT infrastructure. The unit has also benefited from capacity development programmes.	IIEP-UNESCO's (in cooperation with the UNESCO Amman office) contribution to this was indirect, as it provided assistance for the development of an effective technical plan. Through this process, the needs and activities needed in developing the GIS unit's tasks were clearly stated and well organized.

19.	Jordan	To be able to monitor the implementation of the ESP, those responsible for the EMIS developed a comprehensive dashboard with 40 indicators. Each and every indicator was defined, using a special format. This was done just after the launch of the ESP. The dashboard was presented and approved by the Ministry's senior management, responsible for decision-making.	To have the dashboard is a quantum leap for the Ministry, as for the first time we are able to put all the data on a big dashboard. It is available online and can be accessed by all decision-makers at the ministerial level. We have 2016/17 as the baseline year and then the first dashboard used 2017/2018 data to show progress.	IIEP-UNESCO's technical experts provided advice on the formulation of the indicators during the development of the ESP.
20.	Jordan	The Ministry of Education has conducted two annual review meetings. According to the 2019 ESP progress report presented by the Ministry at the ARM in March 2020, 4 out of the 40 key performance indicators lack data and are therefore not monitored. There are also indicators that are not easy to measure. For example, this is the case with an indicator on the percentage of teachers that apply new teaching methods in the classroom. The Ministry has not yet been able to identify a good methodology to measure this indicator.	The annual ESP review has weaknesses because the Ministry cannot report on all indicators. Either the Ministry should be able to measure an indicator correctly or it should change the indicator.	IIEP-UNESCO helped with the formulation of indicators, but there was not sufficient time or discussions on the methodology to be used to measure the indicator.
21.	Jordan	The definition of the ESP indicator comes with a scorecard/template, which details which unit is responsible for the indicator and for providing data to be able to track progress. This is a way to avoid overlaps. These scorecards/templates did not exist before the ESP.	The ESP, as well as the accompanying annual work plan and scorecard template have helped to clarify the roles and responsibilities of each unit in the Ministry. It is clearer what the objectives are and how each unit contributes to achieving the ESP. The indicators also help with this. Every department and unit now knows much better than before what the Ministry aims for and what to do and this is thanks to the ESP.	Indirect contribution of IIEP to the formulation of the ESP and the indicators.

22.	Jordan	At the Ministry, we continue to apply strategic planning following the approach we used with IIEP for the formulation of the ESP. For example, now with the Corona crisis, we started with a joint situation analysis exercise, then we are moving over to identifying the main objectives and sub-objectives and activities. Distance learning is becoming a priority with the current crisis and we need to update the ESP. We also link indicators to this now.	It is a flexible and useful approach that can be helpful in many contexts. It also helps us to work better together	This is the way we learned how to do it with IIEP on the ESP. Some Ministry staff has also been privileged to participate in some other training activities with IIEP, where the same approach is applied to a specific topic. For example, the online crisis sensitive planning course in 2018 and the specialized course in Paris on projects.
23.	Jordan	Since the launch of the ESP in 2018, the research priorities that the Ministry of Education's Research Department will work on are identified in relation to the research needs under the six ESP domains. Each domain includes strategies and the topics are drawn directly from them. Research topics are approved in partnership with the Queen Rania Foundation (QRF) through the Joint Steering Committee (a committee that was established under a grant from the UK for QRF to conduct research. The cooperation with QRF coincided with the development of the ESP). The directorate develops an annual work plan. The plan is flexible and topics are added if the senior management asks for it.	The research department develops annual work plans since many years. Now the development of annual work plans is easier, as the entry points are the six domains in the ESP and then the choices are made within each domain. This is an important change for those working in the Ministry's research department. The ESP has a direct effect on the plans and the tasks of the research department. Before the ESP, the choice of research topics was based more on the interests of the Ministry's senior management. It is now more dependent on the ESP in addition to the concerns of the higher management. There used to be sudden requests for studies, but after the ESP approval, these types of requests are less frequent.	IIEP-UNESCO's contributed to the development of the ESP document and to the way in which the Ministry staff worked together to map the needs and challenges of the concerned departments and divisions, and then to define the objectives and strategies for each of the domain.

24.	Guinée	<p>Depuis la validation du ProDEG en octobre 2019, les Bureaux de stratégie et de développement (BSD – équivalents de Départements de planification) des trois ministères d'éducation préparent leurs plans annuels. L'analyse sectorielle a montré que les rôles des différentes entités impliquées dans la planification du secteur n'étaient pas clairement définis. Le ProDEG a permis de clarifier que les BSD sont les unités responsables de la planification au sein de chaque ministère et que la Cellule CDMT doit jouer le rôle de secrétariat technique du ProDEG et se concentrer sur l'appui technique aux trois BSD et le suivi/pilotage du secteur.</p>	<p>La planification sectorielle se fait maintenant de façon plus efficace car le processus est mieux défini et mieux structuré. Avant la formulation du ProDEG, la Cellule CDMT jouait un rôle beaucoup plus important dans la préparation de ces plans annuels des ministères et les BSD des ministères reprochaient à la Cellule CDMT de jouer leur rôle. Ce n'est plus le cas aujourd'hui.</p>	<p>C'est grâce à l'appui technique de l'IPE – en particulier l'analyse sectorielle (et son analyse institutionnelle) – et au ProDEG que les confusions concernant les responsabilités dans le processus de planification ont été mises en évidence. Cependant, dans la pratique, les trois BSD n'ont pas la même capacité et ne jouaient pas encore pleinement leurs rôles.</p>
25.	Guinée	<p>Depuis la finalisation du chapitre « coûts et financement » du ProDEG mi-2019, le secrétariat du ProDEG continue d'utiliser le modèle de simulation du plan. Il a depuis lors été utilisé pour l'actualisation des projections pour le plan d'action triennal et la préparation du budget de l'État. Ce travail a notamment consisté à réviser les statistiques utilisées pour la construction des salles de classe et les manuels scolaires.</p>	<p>L'utilisation du modèle de simulation signifie que la programmation de l'année 1 (2020-2021) et l'année 2 (2021-2022) de la mise en œuvre du ProDEG est de meilleure qualité. Il existe maintenant de l'expertise au sein des BSD des trois ministères et la Cellule CDMT pour actualiser/ajuster toutes les données et paramètres du plan sectoriel. Le ProDEG est un plan sur dix ans, avec une première tranche de quatre ans. Après ces quatre années de mise en œuvre, il va falloir faire des constats et faire de nouvelles projections pour la seconde phase. Pour cette deuxième phase, les besoins des BSD et de la Cellule CDMT en assistance extérieure devraient être sensiblement moins importants car les compétences nécessaires y existent désormais.</p>	<p>La collaboration entre l'équipe technique nationale et l'IPE a été très efficace avec un développement efficace des capacités concernant la mise à jour du modèle de simulation incluant des estimations de coûts unitaires les plus justes possible. Avant l'analyse sectorielle (RESEN), douze cadres ont aussi suivi le Programme de formation en politique sectorielle de l'IPE à Dakar. Cette formation leur a permis d'acquérir une solide compréhension du processus de planification sectorielle et des compétences en simulations financières. Par conséquent, quand le travail sur le ProDEG a commencé, ce groupe de cadres était déjà familier des concepts et techniques de la planification stratégique. Certains de ces douze cadres sont responsables de la programmation budgétaire du secteur éducatif, soit au sein de l'un des trois ministères, soit au secrétariat du ProDEG.</p>

26.	Guinée	<p>En 2020, le gouvernement guinéen et trois partenaires (Agence Française de Développement, Partenariat Mondial pour l'Éducation et UNICEF) ont créé le Fond commun de l'Éducation sous modalité budget d'affectation spéciale (appelé le FCE/BAS), une modalité d'aide qui s'aligne sur les procédures administratives nationales. Les trois partenaires ont annoncé leur intention de fournir un total de 54 millions d'euros au FCE/BAS pour financer une partie de la mise en œuvre du ProDEG.</p>	<p>La modalité d'aide FCE/BAS permet de fédérer le financement des trois partenaires autour d'une vision stratégie unique et de politiques éducatives cohérentes (le ProDEG) en suivant les procédures nationales. Ce dispositif constitue un changement profond par rapport au précédent plan sectoriel. La modalité « projet » utilisée par ces mêmes partenaires sur la période 2014-2019, alors nommé Fond commun de l'éducation de base (FoCEB) n'était pas alignée sur les priorités de l'ensemble du secteur de l'éducation, mais se concentrait uniquement sur l'éducation de base. Par ailleurs, la coordination et la gestion opérationnelle du plan sectoriel précédent était confié à une unité de gestion de projets composée d'agents contractuels extérieurs à la fonction publique guinéenne.</p>	<p>Le démarrage du FCE/BAS était conditionné à la finalisation et à la validation d'un plan stratégique pour l'ensemble du secteur de l'éducation, le ProDEG. Sans l'aval des partenaires du plan, le FCE/BAS n'aurait pas vu le jour. La contribution de l'IIPE à la formulation du ProDEG était essentielle afin de satisfaire à cette conditionnalité attachée à ce type de financement.</p>
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27.	Guinée	<p>Le Comité Interministériel de Pilotage et de Coordination (CIPC) a validé le ProDEG le 9 octobre 2019. Avec des réunions régulières du CIPC, la préparation et la validation du ProDEG ont ainsi été portées politiquement par les trois Ministères du secteur: le Ministère de l'Education Nationale et de l'Alphabétisation (MENA), le Ministère de l'Enseignement Technique, de la Formation Professionnelle, de l'Emploi et du Travail (METFP-ET) et le Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique (MESRS).</p>	<p>Le travail de ce comité, qui au niveau politique est l'unique structure responsable de la coordination du secteur, ne fonctionnait pas auparavant. C'est avec la préparation du ProDEG que son fonctionnement s'est dynamisé. Au cours de la préparation du ProDEG, le CIPC s'est réuni plusieurs fois pour la validation politique des différentes étapes. Après la validation du ProDEG, ce processus comprenant des réunions régulières du CIPC s'est poursuivi. Avant le ProDEG, quand les financements extérieurs se faisaient en mode projet, la grande majorité des ressources à programmer était focalisée sur l'éducation de base. Par conséquent, les deux autres ministères ne se sentaient pas concernés. Maintenant, en mode programme, chaque ministère a ses propres programmes prioritaires et une enveloppe budgétaire dédiée. La lettre de cadrage comprenant des directives pour chaque ministère est commune, et le ProDEG fournit la vision commune. Cette implication des trois ministères est nouvelle et contribue à une plus grande cohérence sectorielle.</p>	<p>L'IPE n'a pas contribué directement à la redynamisation du CIPC. La contribution de l'Institut est donc plutôt indirecte. L'IPE a insisté sur l'implication des trois ministères dans la préparation du ProDEG afin de développer une vision, une direction commune pour les trois ministères du secteur. L'IPE a aussi facilité les discussions sur les programmes prioritaires et a aidé à la rédaction de certains textes du plan. Ces travaux ont ensuite, de façon synthétisée, été présentés au CIPC pour validation politique.</p>
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28.	Guinée	<p>En décembre 2018, les trois ministres en charge de l'éducation ont nommé les membres de l'Equipe technique nationale, chargée d'élaborer le Plan sectoriel de l'éducation 2019-2028 (ProDEG). L'équipe comprenait un total de 15 membres, dont des représentants des trois ministères du secteur, les ministères financiers et la société civile. La représentation sectorielle a permis de discuter et de travailler sur des questions pertinentes pour tous les sous-secteurs et les programmes prioritaires identifiés couvrant l'ensemble du système éducatif et de la formation.</p>	<p>C'était la première fois que le plan sectoriel était préparé avec une implication aussi forte de tous les principaux acteurs. La préparation du ProDEG par l'équipe technique intersectorielle a nettement réduit les cloisonnements qui existaient entre les trois ministères du secteur. Le travail effectué dans le cadre du précédent PSE n'était pas sectoriel, car il était en grande partie géré comme un projet dans le cadre de MENA, avec une participation limitée des deux autres ministères sectoriels. Dès le départ, la préparation du ProDEG a été différente. En travaillant sur leurs propres programmes prioritaires accompagnés d'une enveloppe budgétaire dédiée, les trois ministères en charge de l'éducation ont réalisé l'importance de la programmation de l'éducation pour leur sous-secteur.</p>	<p>L'IPE a indiqué les profils et les nombres de membres souhaités au sein de l'équipe technique nationale, mais c'est évidemment le gouvernement qui a sélectionné les membres.</p>
29.	Guinée	<p>Le 17 mars 2020, les trois ministres en charge de l'éducation et de la formation, ont créé par l'Arrêté conjoint AC/2020/857 le Secrétariat Technique permanent du ProDEG. Le Secrétariat consiste de six cadres, deux de chaque ministère du secteur, et d'un Secrétaire permanent responsable de la coordination de la mise en œuvre du ProDEG.</p>	<p>Le secrétariat technique est une structure pérenne, ancré dans la fonction publique guinéenne et comprenant des cadres des trois ministères. Ceci est un changement important, car la structure précédente était une structure parallèle à l'administration publique.</p>	<p>L'analyse institutionnelle, conduite par une équipe nationale avec l'appui de l'IPE, a démontré les faiblesses de la structure existante pour coordonner le travail du secteur. L'élaboration du ProDEG, auquel l'IPE a contribué, a permis de proposer une structure plus pérenne en incluant les trois ministères. Les échanges ont permis de stipuler que le Comité Interministériel de Pilotage et de Coordination (CIPC) reste l'organe responsable de la coordination de la mise en œuvre du ProDEG au niveau politique, auquel le Secrétariat Technique rend compte. Lors des discussions au sein de l'équipe technique nationale, l'IPE a facilité et résumé les échanges. Ceci a par la suite facilité les prises de décisions par le CIPC.</p>

30.	Guinée	L'équipe technique du ProDEG a formulé l'enseignement technique et professionnel comme une priorité sectorielle forte en incluant un programme prioritaire dédié à l'extension et à la réforme de l'enseignement technique et de la formation professionnelle dans le plan sectoriel. Le choix des six programmes prioritaires du ProDEG a été validé par le Comité Interministériel de Pilotage et de Coordination en mars 2019.	Cette fois-ci l'équipe technique nationale du ProDEG a de façon formel décrit et élaboré les priorités nationales pour le secteur Education dans son ensemble. Ceci est en rupture avec le mode projet par le biais duquel certains partenaires techniques et financiers peuvent promouvoir des priorités prédéfinies et maîtriser les procédures.	En terme de définition des politiques éducatives prioritaires, c'est le processus comprenant l'analyse sectorielle et l'élaboration du plan, avec ses nombreuses discussions et réflexions au sein de l'équipe technique nationale et lors des consultations, qui a permis d'élaborer l'enseignement technique et professionnelle comme une priorité politique forte pour le secteur, et le pays, dans son ensemble. L'originalité dans l'élaboration du ProDEG est que, certes l'équipe a été accompagnée par l'IPE, mais l'IPE n'est jamais venu imposer ses choix à l'équipe. L'IPE n'a apporté que de l'expertise, les choix ont été proposé aux décideurs par l'équipe nationale.
31.	Guinée	Lors de la préparation du plan d'action budgétisé du ProDEG mi 2019, tous les principaux partenaires techniques et financiers du secteur éducatif ont fourni des informations concernant leurs différentes contributions financières pour la mise en œuvre du plan.	La lisibilité des différentes contributions financières des partenaires et cela est utile pour la programmation et le suivi sectoriel. Cette lisibilité n'existait pas avant.	L'IPE a appuyé techniquement les trois ministères et le Secrétariat technique du ProDEG dans la préparation du plan d'action. L'Institut a insisté sur la nécessité d'inclure toutes les contributions bilatérales dans le plan d'action.
32.	Guinée	Le 10 juillet 2020, le Premier ministre a présenté la lettre de cadrage et les orientations budgétaires du Gouvernement pour l'année 2021. Dans cette lettre, le Premier ministre annonce une augmentation de 20% des crédits budgétaires en faveur du secteur éducatif par rapport à la loi de finance initiale de 2020.	Les trois ministères sectoriels ainsi que leurs partenaires clés ont fait, au cours des premiers mois de 2020, un plaidoyer pour une plus forte mobilisation de ressources domestiques pour l'éducation auprès du Premier ministre et des ministères financiers. L'argument principal était que la réalisation des objectifs ambitieux du ProDEG nécessitait une augmentation de la part du budget national allouée à l'éducation. A condition que les décaissements suivent, cette augmentation importante du budget de l'éducation pour l'année 2021 devrait permettre une meilleure mise en œuvre du plan sectoriel.	La contribution de l'IPE à ce résultat est indirecte, via son appui à la formulation d'un plan stratégique sectoriel de qualité. Sans ce plan unifié pour le secteur, une telle augmentation n'aurait probablement pas été annoncée.

